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  he  economic,  social,  and  political
challenges  Libyans  will  face  in  the
aftermath of its civil war will be enormous. With
the state's economic and political institutions
having been weakened, Libya will need to
restructure its economy. It will need to move
away from excessive reliance on the state and
on  hydrocarbon  revenues  while  becoming
more subject to regulation, efficiency concerns
and diversification required to put to work its
large number of unemployed citizens.  In order
to make economic reforms work, Libya will
simultaneously need to develop a political
formula  that  is  acceptable  to  different
segments of the population. Finally, in support
of its economic reform and reconstruction
efforts, Libya will need to create a system of
law and accountability that serves its citizens
equitably and provides clear guidelines for its
economy. 
Strictly  speaking,  the  re-construction  of  the
institutions of the former Libya will not be necessary.
Rather, Libya will need to create for the first time,
the kinds of rules, mutual obligations, and checks
and balances that mark modern states and
modern economies.
In light of Libya’s traditional distrust between
different tribal groups and between the different
provinces, and due to the absence of  necessary
frameworks and institutions to resolve differences,
governance challenges in the post-conflict period
will prove enormous. 
Furthermore, the reconstruction of Libya will need
to be both integrated and systemic, interweaving
various social, political, legal, and economic
initiatives that can help prevent the kind of
backsliding that disparate efforts at economic
and legal reform or political liberalization, if made
in isolation, often provoke. 
The impact of the conflict on Libya’s economy
will  have  significant  ramifications  on  the
country's  economic  reconstruction.  The
assumption in this paper is that Libya's oil
infrastructure has emerged relatively unscathed
from the conflict.  A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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2 – Background: The Economics of a Rentier 
State
V
oluminous literature exists on the impact of large inflows of
unregulated capital on the economic and political fortunes of so
called rentier, allocative, non-productive, or distributive states.1 The
following contains a highly stylized account of the literature, mostly by
institutional economists and political economists−meant to not only
elucidate the economic problems oil exporters face, but to elaborate
on how closely economic strategies and political survival become
intertwined in countries like Libya, something all future economic
interlocutors in Libya will need to keep in mind. 
The concept of the rentier state has become a commonly accepted
paradigm, albeit often a conceptually inadequate one, through which 
oil exporters’ development has been viewed. Despite suffering from
definitional ambiguities, a number of findings on so-called resource 
curses, and of links between the economics and politics of natural
resource-led  development,  have  become  standard  aspects  of
development debates. One set of findings centers squarely on the
deleterious economic consequences of rentier-type development.2
The most specific problem observed is the inability of governments
to  create  what  one  could  call  “more  decisive  macroeconomic
institutions" that allow for swift and efficient adjustment. The broader
charge is that serious economy-wide distortions take place: Dutch
Disease3 and what are called institutional shifts (the distortion or
evisceration  of  regulatory  and  extractive  institutions  in  favor  of
distributional mechanisms that can be politically manipulated).4
The arguments about weak macro-economic management and Dutch
Disease are sufficiently robust in the literature to not warrant further
discussion here.5 Institutional shifts, and the two-way link between
institutional deficiencies and a more open political system, have been
less frequently discussed.  The argument is that in productive economies,
the ability to extract resources has resulted in two complementary
developments: the appearance of a host of regulatory institutions
(including fiscal, legal and information-gathering mechanisms) to respond
to the growing complexity of the state’s economic organization, and the
demand for representation in return for taxation. 
In countries like Libya this iron triangle of extraction, institutional
development and representation over time did not take place. Indeed,
the country witnessed a gradual disarticulation of the country's institutional
structures, and felt no need−or proved unable−to create institutional
diversity. In such states rulers face minimal pressures to specify property
rights6  in order to help maximize income. They neither need to create
nor monitor internal taxes to maximize income from their citizens, they
do not have to worry about transaction costs, and they need relatively
few agents (who can furthermore be temporarily imported) to run their
economies. The direction of macroeconomic policy, as the most glaring
example, becomes less subject to the need for consensus within local
societies.
As long as oil revenue remains high, there is little need for individuals
to influence public agencies and to help shape public policy to their
material advantage. There is little incentive to actively engage the state
to determine the contours of local social contracts. With citizens acting
as  rent  takers,  and  there  being  no  need  for  clearly  articulated
bureaucracies and state institutions to evolve in order to capture gains
from trade, perverse growth ensues. Governmental bureaucracies—
swollen as part of implicit or explicit social contracts—turn into a rentier
class. Beyond that, because citizens do not contribute to the creation
of wealth, they are hard pressed to argue for either a greater share of
the state’s distributive largesse or for reform. The atomistic tendency
of this type of development, particularly at the popular level, is to create
personal rather than group interests. 
Also, as a result of the emphasis on distribution, rulers in oil exporting
countries  tend to spend inordinate amounts of time trying to promote
their clients and to create supporting coalitions to stave off other claimants
to the country’s wealth and power. Much of this maneuvering is concealed
by the way in which the country’s revenues are shielded from public
scrutiny. Decisions concerning economic policies, distribution and
investments are, as a control mechanism, kept to the purview of small
coalitions, rather than assigned to the market. 
Not surprisingly therefore, distributive largesse is more often than not
augmented with reliance on informal mechanisms linked to history, religion
or culture.7
When the ruler’s fortunes and existence are closely tied to distribution
of revenues and to his effectiveness in managing support coalitions,
economic crises invariably threaten to become political crises. As a
result, oil exporters tend to postpone reform of their economies, and
their existing economic institutions, that were created as a direct
response to international economic forces during the oil booms. To
avoid reforms oil exporters create intricate social contracts that target
specific groups that are judged crucial to regime survival or that are
more geared toward the general population. They consist of extensive
patronage and intermediation that turn into entitlements−and that
prove extremely difficult to dislodge when economic reform is needed.8 A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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In the wake of Libya's unsuccessful attempts at economic reform in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, most international financial institutions agreed
that a far-reaching economic reorientation would have been essential in
light of the country's dire economic circumstances. Economists were
undecided on the reasons for Libya's unsuccessful reform attempts. They
wondered whether the attempts themselves had simply been dilatory, or
whether Libya's economy was structurally and institutionally flawed.  The
former would indicate proximate causes: a country where the policy pieces
are in place, but that was underperforming relative to its factor endowments
because of a lack of commitment and will. The latter is qualitatively different,
and would indicate that Libya was saddled with deeper and more
intransigent obstacles: weak institutions, problems of governance, and a
host of socio-cultural factors (including an encrusted social contract) that
effectively prevented reform. This paper argues that Libya fell squarely
within the second category.
Reflecting the growing importance of institutional economics in the mid-
1970s and beyond, the economic development literature, particularly
pertaining to oil exporters, noted that economic growth and reform should
not simply consist of an emphasis on privatization and deregulation that
would endogenously create in its wake institutions as a byproduct of
economic growth. But it should include—and be preceded by—an
emphasis on governance and supervision, incentives, assurances about
property rights, the creation of social safety nets, transparency, capable
bureaucracies,  and  a  host  of  other  supportive  mechanisms  that 
must support reforms. This included taking into consideration a host of
non-market institutions that reflect the differing social contexts within which
they operate.9 The broader lesson was that institutional solutions and
appropriate policies for growth and reform are subject to and embedded
within a certain political context that, unless taken into account, may doom
whatever recommendations are provided. This is particularly the case—
as Libya proves−in countries where calculations about growth and reform
are subject to many of the larger political difficulties as outlined in this paper. 
The economic characteristics of oil exporters outlined above quickly
became apparent in Libya after the first sales of oil in 1961. By 1969,
when  Colonel Qadhafi came to power, the country already exhibited all
the characteristics of an oil exporter: a dualistic economy where, beyond
the oil sector, a number of other inefficient sectors and bureaucracies
still employed the majority of the Libyan population. Although per capita
income at $2,168 in 1969 had improved dramatically from the subsistence
level at the beginning of the monarchy, the increase was almost solely
due to oil revenues.10
When the first tentative and cautious directives for the country’s
economy emerged in March 1970, they were marked by a suspicion
of the role of the private sector, and aimed to bring the non-oil sectors
as well under state control. The country’s history of crony capitalism
during the monarchy had sparked much anger among those who had
led the coup, and they clearly considered private entrepreneurship
suspect. The private sector was, at least temporarily, retained, but the
new decrees clearly stated that it could not impinge upon or contradict
the economic policies of the government. It was also clear that retaining
the private sector was a policy the government intended to correct
when it was in a position to do so.
By the time of the first oil crisis in 1973, Libya exhibited the typical
economic and political pathologies of an allocative, non-productive state:
• Regulatory deficiencies
• Pervasive rent-seeking
• Incoherent and low levels of economic regulation
• A dualistic economy
• Incoherent economic policies
• State dominance of the economy
• Excessive patronage and intermediation 
• High regime autonomy
• Fragmentation of society
The economic policies of the Libyan government in the wake of the
quadrupling of oil prices proved even more destructive. It is difficult in
this regard to underestimate the immediate and long-term impact of
the Green Book that appeared after the mid-1970s. The Green Book's
economic directives led to a further weakening of whatever regulatory
mechanisms the country had at the time, and it led to a more determined
effort to hollow out institutions that were meant to provide coherence 
and guidance to economic planning. In the process a number of ancillary
institutions−such as a coherent and transparent legal framework−that
underpinned them were left neglected. In several cases this involved
the physical destruction, the shifting around, or the actual abandonment
of government ministries, planning institutes, and research centers.
Where they continued to exist, their coherence was dramatically 
reduced, or subject to directives by the Revolutionary Committees that
protected the revolution.11
In contrast to more mature economies where the state over relatively
long periods of time develops and fine-tunes a set of regulatory,
extractive  and  distributive  mechanisms  to  guide  economic
development, in Libya this evolutionary process was curtailed and
undermined  by  the  stipulations  of  the  Green  Book.  Ideological
considerations, together with the power afforded by rapid inflows of
capital produced a curious example of a centrally unplanned state: aA f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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state where a panoply of social, economic and political challenges far
outstripped its capabilities and its ability to address them. As a result,
wholesale "management" and extensive patronage and intermediation
became a dominant feature of the economic landscape.
Access to the tiny circle of trust at the highest decision-making level
provided intricate channels for economic largesse and distributive
purposes, while the regulatory and legal capacities of state and
economic institutions—already weakened by the initial state-building
processes  described  above−tended  to  remain  inefficient  and
underdeveloped. The lack of economic data in Libya, the physical
destruction of state bureaucratic offices and records, and the state’s
sporadic, direct intervention in issues ranging from employment to price
setting to property rights issues were all shortcuts−signs of regulatory
weakness.  
The Libyan economy thus grew in a peculiar fashion as a result of how
its revenues were obtained. The questions that are at the heart of every
political system were historically less pressing to the Libyan government:
how revenues are gathered, what compromises the ruler must make
with his subjects to obtain them, which institutional capabilities the state
needed to develop this task, and how those institutional arrangements
reflected the interests of both ruled and ruler. The result in Libya was
the emergence of a state that was seemingly highly autonomous, but
without much regulatory capacity, exacerbated by an official ideology
that celebrated this hollowing out of state power and regulatory
capabilities.  
As Libya's efforts at reform−in 1987, after 1990, and after 2003−would
show, the legacy of this avoidance of creating modern institutions for
economic management would cast a deep shadow.  Efforts at sustained
economic reform throughout the world have shown that moving toward
markets, under conditions where there is no real history of them, requires
careful and greater regulation by the state. This implies not simply
handing over everything to the market but at least, initially, a greater
willingness of the state to get more involved in regulation. For reasons
that closely linked economic strategy to regime survival, Libya at several
junctures deliberately stepped back from this kind of regulation and
from creating or maintaining state institutions that could have established
such regulation.  
It explains why a seemingly very powerful state like Libya, capable of
determining the minutiae of its citizens’ lives, did not, as this paper will
argue below, have the capacity to successfully implement reforms at
the end of the 1980s and during the early 1990s.  And it also makes it
clear why the proposed reforms continued to create such resistance
after 2003. The reasons clearly lie within the broader social and political
structures within which Libya's economy is embedded. The country’s
institutions, often created as a direct response to international economic 
forces during oil booms, appeared inflexible and undifferentiated to deal
with fiscal crises that threatened previous distributive policies. In Libya,
as in all oil exporters, economic crises and economic reform threaten
to become profound political crises−and hence rulers tend to avoid or
circumscribe them.
In summary, oil revenues produced the usual rentier economy pathologies
in Libya−and the Green Book exacerbated them: low and inconsistent
regulation, overcentralization of economic power in the hands of the
regime, Dutch Disease, lack of diversification, high inefficiencies, and
extensive patronage. These negative developments were heightened
even further by an insistence that the institutions of a modern state were
inappropriate and should be abandoned. State intervention in the economy
nevertheless was pervasive but primitive: it dominated all manufacturing,
agriculture, foreign and domestic retail trade; banking, insurance, as well
as major services. State trading companies were in charge of all industrial,
manufacturing and agricultural imports. The government furthermore
intervened indirectly through interest-free credit, state spending, subsidies,
and price manipulation of goods. By 1987 an estimated 70-75 percent
of all Libyans were government employees. The creation of state
supermarkets extended state control down to the retail level.A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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3.   Economic Reforms in Libya
Early Reform Efforts
I
n 1987, in the wake of the US sanctions, Libya embarked upon its first
wave of reforms.12 These reforms centered around the introduction of
tashrukiyya (self-management) enterprises that allowed for the creation
of cooperatives despite the earlier injunctions of the Green Book against
private enterprise. Within one year, approximately 140 medium- and small-
scale enterprises were created that, at least in principle, no longer enjoyed
state subsidies. Simultaneously, the ban against the retail trade was lifted,
allowing private shops to re-open. In September 1988, the state’s
monopoly on imports and exports was abandoned, as well as subsidies
on tea, flour, salt, and wheat. Farmers’ markets – officially abandoned
but reluctantly tolerated during the revolutionary decade – reappeared.
Professionals were allowed to resume private practices, even though the
government maintained its role in setting fees.
The range of measures taken after 1990 were meant to reinforce and
extend this earlier wave of reforms. Private sector enterprises were now
allowed to “take the burden off public institutions.”13The new regulations
suggested the closing of unprofitable state enterprises, the imposition
of higher fees for state-provided services like water and electricity, and
a reduction of the number of state employees. In a decision that some
Libyans viewed as a means to further provoke de-politicization, there
was also a further populist measure: a decentralization of the country
that would shift the administrative burdens and expenses away from
the  major  coastal  cities  into  smaller  administrative  communities
responsible for their own budgets. 
The  country's  legislature  (General  People's  Congress−GPC)
simultaneously adopted a number of laws that provided for joint-stock
companies, creating the ability to open foreign currency accounts and
to obtain import permits for private companies. For that purpose, a
number of state and commercial banks were created. Hoping to capture
some of the capital flows that sustained the informal economy, special
laws were passed to offer protection for reinvested capital. The second
wave’s final directives, in the Spring and Summer of 1993, focused on
efforts to promote tourism – hoping to capitalize on the country’s desert
and archaeological sites – and to provide greater guarantees for foreign
investment. Convertibility of the Libyan dinar was taken up by the GPC
in January 1994 but remained unaddressed.14
At the surface, the number and range of measures suggested in the
adopted legislation would have made the Libyan infitah (liberalization)
one of the most dramatic in the region’s history of economic reforms
during the 1980s and 1990s. It would also have dramatically recalibrated
the position of the state within the economy and, by implication, altered
the way in which economic patronage could be used for political
objectives. Starting in early 1988, Libya's official gazette and the GPC
proceedings included a wide array of regulations meant to speed up
the reform process. 
The reality, however, contrasted sharply with the proposed intentions.
Most of the adopted laws were never implemented although some
private  traders  returned−suspicious  and  reluctantly−to  re-open
their businesses. Few proved willing to take serious risks amidst the
remaining uncertainties and unpredictability of economic and political
life in Libya. They opted instead for small-scale economic activities –
usually of a service nature – that carried low risks and required little
private investment. There was no evidence that the new tashrukiyya
enterprises ever operated as envisioned. There was similarly little
evidence that a real retreat of the state had taken place. Although some
subsidies were lowered, the proposals for increased fees for government
services were never implemented. Whatever cutbacks took place were
often put on the shoulders of the country’s foreign labor, in effect
protecting the country’s own consumers.
From 1987 through 1989 Libya consistently ran trade deficits that were
only turned around by rising oil prices in 1989 when the country’s current
account moved once more into the black, bringing its international
reserves to $5.8 billion. Despite the announced changes in the country’s
banking system, the Jamahiriyya’s commercial banks were non-
functioning, and would only be revived almost fifteen years later. Banks
in general supported public enterprises at the behest of the ministries
to which public enterprises were consigned – and thus indirectly at the
discretion of the government. 
In effect, liberalization’s impact could perhaps best be described as
a subterfuge – where a hesitating, newly created private sector was
allowed to provide and distribute what the state through its inefficient
distribution system of state supermarkets could not deliver to Libyan
citizens, leaving the state in charge of the distribution of welfare
provisions. As a result, by the mid-1990s Libya was filled once more
with the kind of consumer goods and food supplies it had enjoyed
before the revolutionary decade. The lack of confidence in the local
economy, however, was demonstrated by the fact that for most
everyday purchases the US dollar had become the currency of choice.
Government pronouncements further added uncertainty. The Leader
noted that Libya's attempted reforms only represented failure, and would
lead to a new form of economic colonialism.A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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Reforms in Libya Since 2003
In retrospect, the period between 2003 and early 2011 would mark
Libya’s most significant attempt at reforming its economy−but it would
once more be significantly circumscribed by the politics of the regime.
The country found itself at a particularly important fork in the road. On
the one hand, it could pursue the type of state-led market reform that
relied on cooperation between the state and a number of business
coalitions.  Alternatively, Libya could pursue economic liberalization and
reform while moving away from what one could conclude as a patronage-
driven and patrimonial system of the past. 
In January 2002 already, the country had announced its intention to
open up its economy further and to attract foreign capital to the country.
For that purpose, it unified its exchange rate, pegging the Libyan dinar
to the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights, in effect devaluing the country’s
official exchange rate by more than half as part of a strategy toward
unification of the country’s multi-tier (official, commercial, black-market)
foreign exchange system. The devaluation was also meant to increase
the competitiveness of Libyan firms and to help attract foreign investment
into the country. The same month Libya cut its customs duty rate by
50% on most imports, hoping to offset the effects of its currency
devaluation.
In March 2003, the General People’s Congress adopted legislation
meant to augur in the country’s third attempt at liberalization and reform.
It included an authorization to privatize a large number of the country’s
state-owned economic enterprises. In June, the government admitted
that the country’s public sector had failed and should be abolished,
and called in addition for privatization of the country’s oil sector. Shukri
Muhammad Ghanem, known as a proponent of liberalization and
privatization, became Prime Minister. After a period working at OPEC,
the Prime Minister clearly saw his task as removing, as much as possible,
the inefficiencies that the state-controlled economy had created in the
previous decades.15
The Energy Ministry was restored and the Libyan National Oil Company
(LNOC)  negotiated  the  return  of  the  Oasis  Group  (Marathon  Oil,
ConocoPhillips,  and  Amerada  Hess)  to  their  Waha  and  Zueitina
concessions, a move that was meant to send reassuring signals to other
US oil companies.
After decades of avoiding the advice of international financial institutions,
the country also accepted its obligations under Article VIII of the IMF’s
Articles of Agreement and in October 2003 released the details of the
IMF’s first Article IV consultations which called, among other issues, for
wide structural reforms, improved macroeconomic management, and
the removal of trade barriers and price subsidies. The IMF report in part
informed the deliberation and adoption of a number of the economic
directives taken up by the General People’s Congress in March 2004.
The same month a list of 360 state-owned companies that would either
be privatized or liquidated was published. 
Over two decades of sanctions, the combination of the country’s 
economic  legacy  of  a  widely  perceived  inefficiently  state-run
economy,  together  with  economic  and  political  hardships
engendered by those sanctions, had increased internal pressures
from a burgeoning younger population with scant possibilities of
meaningful  employment.  Libya’s  unemployment  in  2003  was
estimated at 30% and in 2004, 862,000 Libyans still depended on
the state for their livelihood.  Libya needed outside investment and
expertise for new oil and natural gas exploration, and for restoring
or updating some of the oil industry’s industrial and oil infrastructure
which the LNOC readily admitted was outdated.16 
Libya’s objectives under the economic reforms were clearly spelled
out by the Prime Minister: 
"The strategies and initiatives that we are taking... [are] trying [to create]
a new and comprehensive architecture for the national economy...
[which includes] a lot of incentives to foreign investors, such as tax
exemptions in the first few years, a major cut in corporate taxes,
establishing a free zone in Misurata [Misrata] and opening the capital
of  public  companies  for  foreign  investors...  [and]  to  cut  down
mismanagement and corruption and of course bureaucracy.”17
The practical measures in support of the new strategy were adopted
by the General People’s Congress at its March 2004 annual meeting.
In addition to the 360 companies singled out for privatization, the new
measures included extensive banking sector reform and the introduction
of private banks. The proposals also encompassed tax reform, the
creation of a stock exchange, newly relaxed rules for foreign companies
investing in Libya, and a plan to promote the country’s almost non-
existent tourist sector. 
The technical language of the IMF report at the time summarized the
challenges Libya would face as it embarked upon the proposed reforms:
"The key challenge facing the authorities in the medium and long-term
is to achieve sustainable high rates of economic growth to generate
employment opportunities for a rapidly growing labour force. The
authorities agreed that this goal would not be achievable without a
drastic  reduction  in  the  dominant  role  of  the  public  sector  ...A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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Unemployment, which may be as high as 30 percent, remains one of
Libya’s greatest problems, with the bloated state sector unable to
accommodate the many new job-seekers produced by the fast growing
population. Until private sector reform starts delivering tangible results,
the problem – compounded by the 1997 move to open Libya’s border
to 2 million African immigrants – is only likely to worsen."
The IMF urged the Libyan authorities to move toward greater budget
transparency and to cast the country’s budget within a coordinated
medium-term framework that would take into account the non-renewable
nature of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources. 
Although the new reforms asked for greater diversification of Libya’s
economy, the hydrocarbon sector would once more be called upon
to provide the necessary revenues. By 2003, only one quarter of the
country’s territory had been seriously explored for oil and, except for
one patch along Libya’s western coastal area, only one area for
offshore drilling. Both the Libyan government and international oil
companies expected that the country’s proven reserves of 30 billion
barrels could easily be raised to 130 billion barrels, clearly making
Libya one of the top three investment destinations worldwide for oil
companies.
In 2003 Libya was exporting roughly 1.5 million barrels per day,
significantly less than its 1970 production. The LNOC now wanted to
increase production to 3 million barrels per day – the equivalent of its
1970 production – but admitted that Libya needed roughly $30 billion
of FDI to do so, $10 billion alone by 2010.  In addition, plans were
developed to extensively explore the country’s enormous natural gas
deposits – increasing production for export to 40–50 billion cubic meters
per year within ten years – and to update the country’s Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG) infrastructure which was limited to one liquefaction plant at
Marsa al-Burayqa. In order to encourage investment in the hydrocarbon
sector, Libya carefully designed a new set of Exploration and Production
Sharing Agreements (EPSA IV) that, judging by the enthusiasm with
which international oil companies flocked to Tripoli, proved once more
the attractiveness of Libyan oil.
The awarding of the EPSA concessions in January 2005 revealed Libya’s
priorities. Eleven of the fifteen oil exploration licenses went to US
companies,  including  Occidental,  Amerada  Hess,  and  Chevron
Texaco. Clearly, one of Libya’s priorities was to have United States firms
closely involved once more in the country’s oil industry, even if doing so
seemingly came at the expense of the European companies – particularly
French-owned Total – that had supported the country during the
sanctions period. 
That same month, at the Davos World Economic Forum, a vast reform
program for the Libyan economy was announced in these terms,“the
old times are finished and Libya is ready to move onto a new stage
of modernization… [which] will be conducted in a well organized
manner that ensures new ownership and ownership by the people
of Libya, not just a small class of oligarchs.” It was added that Libya
had recruited some world experts to help in the effort, and conceded
that” [t] here may be some reaction against them in Libya, but they
are the best.”18 Following this announcement, the publication of the
National Economic Strategy: An Assessment of the Competitiveness
of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya by the Monitor Group was meant as
an overall blueprint for future Libyan development.19
The Monitor report provided the first country-wide outside review of Libya's
economy since the revolution. It not only summarized the purely economic
challenges  of  the  country,  but  also  alluded  to  the  non-economic
considerations−lack of a positive environment, of trust, of lack of incentives,
of regime security concerns− that had kept the Libyan economy in a state-
dominated straightjacket.20 It proposed "A Vision for Libya 2019" that
would make the country a regional leader in development. It suggested a
number of areas, dominated by the country's energy sector, that could
lead to diversification, employment opportunities, and growth: tourism,
agriculture, construction, and transit-trade−and of clustering economic
activities within those sectors for greater efficiency. And it reiterated that
Libya showed all the economic and social pathologies of a distributive
state: low productivity, neglect of sectors outside the energy revenue-
producing sector, obstacles to private entrepreneurship, a non-transparent
business environment, weak legal statutes, "bad" bureaucracies, the
inefficient use of the banking sector, the neglect of FDI, a host of governance
and regulatory weaknesses and, as a result of the latter, the omnipresent
patterns of patronage and informal transactions.  
The report recommended the establishment of an Economic Development
Board, gingerly suggesting that one of the key challenges in Libya
centered around "defining the role of government in facilitating wealth
creation" in a fashion that goes to the heart of the argument this paper
makes about its possible reconstruction:
"The New Economic Strategy Project aims to move Libya from a distributive
economy with under-developed institutions to a unique mixed economy
model that balances market mechanisms with the values [of the Green
Book]... The government has a major role to play: creating political and
legal stability, an efficient basic infrastructure and strengthening both the
macroeconomic and microeconmic environment for private enterprise to
prosper. This will be a critical issue in the Jamahiriya, where state legal and
regulatory institutions traditionally have been weak."21A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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And it pointed at precisely the nexus between patronage and state
resources that add to the difficulty of reform in distributive states 
like Libya:
"... there is typically resistance to change from those who benefit from
the distribution of revenues from natural resources such as oil, import
licenses and other government-granted privileges. On the other hand,
those in government may also be wary of economic reform, knowing
it will create new power centers in civil society which do not depend
on government patronage."22
In the years following the Davos speech and the publication of the
Monitor report, the Libyan government embarked on an ambitious set
of initiatives to reform the country’s economy by reducing the public
sector, adjusting employment patterns, promoting diversification, and
creating greater transparency and regulatory mechanisms. Salaries for
government employees and those working in state-owned companies,
after being frozen for decades, were raised substantially. Several major
companies, including banks and the country’s mobile phone sector,
had been selected for privatization. Many of the onerous requirements
for business visitors were eased, and custom tariffs on a whole range
of goods and commodities reduced or abolished. Local technocrats
investigated  the  possibilities  for  increasing  the  efficiency  and
attractiveness of free economic zones along the coast. Domestic fuel
prices were allowed to rise, and traditional subsidies for water and
electricity were reduced. 
As suggested by the National Economic Strategy plan, the Economic
Development Board was established in early 2007, and was meant
to coordinate, speed up and oversee the different privatization and
liberalization initiatives. As always in the past the oil and gas sector
had been the recipient of the most prudent, independent advice,
further indicating the privileged position it enjoyed in the country’s
economy. 
But the resistance the proposed reforms generated proved enormous.23
The removal of the prime minister in March 2006 marked the beginning
of a marked slowdown of the reforms.2 This was perhaps not so
surprising, the proposed reforms entailed a substantial upgrading of
the state's ability to regulate in order to, down the road, augur in a more 
de-regulated economy. It was clear from unfolding events during the
period that many of the regime's most powerful economic clients
preferred to retain the old structures.26
As was noted at the time, the most essential questions regarding the
long-term feasibility of real reform had not changed:
"How far can these reforms take place in a political system where
extensive patronage has been part and parcel of political survival for so
long? How does a state where unchecked leadership has been such
a dominant feature of politics respond and adapt to a slow process of
more effective bureaucratization that inevitably accompanies real
economic liberalization, and that would inexorably reshape the interaction
between the Libyan state and its citizens?  Fundamentally... the two
essential questions Libya faces in its latest attempt at reform−neither
of which is inherently easier than the other—is whether to create viable
institutions beyond the coercive and distributive ones that can then
guide the economic reforms, or whether to reform and adapt existing
institutions to reduce powerful coalitional and patronage systems?"27 
The 2003-2011 period clearly and unambiguously provided answers
to those questions. And the government's own pronouncements on
the  country’s  economic  strategy,  reflecting  political  and  security
considerations at the expense of economic ones, proved unhelpful. The
Leader continued to show a strong personal suspicion of the new
economic plans. Where the National Economic Strategy had urged
diversification into health, tourism, construction, and other non-oil
projects, he derided the presence of foreigners in the country, arguing
that they drained Libya of its resources. This was followed soon
afterwards by a number of speeches in which the Leader took his own
citizens to task for their dependence on oil revenues, expatriate labor,
and on massive imports, then later urged Libyans to start manufacturing
the goods they needed.
In March 2008 the country's cabinet was dissolved because it had failed
to distribute the country's revenues adequately to Libyan citizens,28 and
the idea to distribute oil money directly to all Libyans was reintroduced.29
Finally, in a move that augured badly for the new economic approach,
several businessmen were arrested on the grounds that they had violated
the principles of the Green Book's people's socialism. 
While it was also clear that these pronouncements were unlikely to derail
the larger initiatives the country had embarked upon, they reinforced
the uncertainty that had long prevailed in Libya and that made individuals
suspicious of becoming entrepreneurs. As a result, they further slowed
down the needed changes in the five areas identified in the National
Economic Strategy plan within the non-hydrocarbon sectors. In many
ways, the differing pronouncements on Libyan economic reforms at the
highest decision making levels were good indicators of the larger, more
structural obstacles at hand.  
Despite this inevitable slowdown, Libya's economy continued to show
slow and incremental improvements toward greater efficiency in itsA f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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regulatory capacities. By end 2010, the country had made some
progress in creating the statutes necessary to implement some of the
reforms, leading to the adoption of a series of major laws governing
economic  life  that  were  adopted  after  2003  (See  Box  1).
Also by 2010, a further plethora of stipulations regarding Commercial
Law, Customs Law, Income Tax Law, Stock Market Law, Labor Law,
Communications  Law,  Land  Registry  Law,  and  laws  regulating 
the activities of the Libyan Investment Authority had been adopted. 
The IMF's 2010 Article IV Consultation's preliminary conclusions 
that year reflected both the positive side of these developments, but
once more underscored the persisting lack of reliable data, the continued
over-reliance on hydrocarbon revenues, and it hinted at the broader
governance issues that persisted.30 
In sum, though the 2003-2011 period saw some improvements in
reforms, the period carried some contradictory messages that
demonstrated the political pressures to which the reforms were
subjected: 
• There is little doubt that compared to its previous attempts at economic
reform, Libya had made progress, and that slowly pockets of greater
efficiency, of more consistent regulatory practices, and of adherence
to international norms were emerging. 
• Diversification and privatization of the economy lagged far behind.
There was little evidence that either the Export Promotion Center of
the Privatization and Investment Board had produced noticeable
results. 
• The country's institutional and legal frameworks remained highly
opaque; the business environment remained in most instances
unpredictable. 
• Ideological proclivities continued to play havoc with the implementation
of the planned reforms, particularly since there were no formal (and
only weak informal) mechanisms to reduce their impact. The climate
of uncertainty and ineffectiveness that had somewhat diminished,
but never disappeared, kept hampering progress.
• Overall coordination remained weak, decision-making remained
fragmented, and there were clear signs that the power of intermediaries
and brokers—had increased. 
• The economic reforms remained to some extent non-institutionalized—
with no official representation, and plans did not carry the imprimatur
of the country's existing political structure.
• In  some  of  the  main  areas  the  National  Economic  Strategy 
had identified as priority areas−human capital, education, and
unemployment−very little progress had been made.31
Box 1: Recent reforms in Libya
• Creation of the Tripoli stock market in March 2007, meant in
part to speed along the privatization of public companies.
• Creation of a more streamlined banking system, with the 
privatization of  the banking system and foreign investment
as majority stake holder starting in 2007 (Sahara Bank).
• Reduction of the minimum investment threshold from $50
million to $1 million in 2006.
• Creation of the Libyan Investment Authority as the country's
sovereign wealth fund. 
• August 2009: establishment of the Privatization and Investment
Board,  meant to establish a one-stop shop to streamline
business license applications, and to instill greater investor
confidence.
• New income tax (January 2010), flat rates of 10 and 20 % for
individuals and corporations.
• Creation of an Export Promotion Center to boost trade, and
to boost agriculture, light manufacturing and under-promoted
sectors.
• The establishment of a centralized export center at the Tunisian
border to help market Libyan products in regional markets.
• Legislation that would push forward attempts to have the
Tripoli airport  and free zones on the coast act as regional
hubs.
• Legislation in support of tourist projects around Cyrene and
other archaeological sites.A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
10
AfDB
E c o n o m i c   B r i e f
S e p t e m b e r   2 0 1 1   •   w w w . a f d b . o r g
4. Reconstructing  Libya:  Post-conflict 
Realities and Economic Planning
T
his paper so far has analyzed the characteristics of Libya's
economy as it emerged and was managed until early 2011. Its
main arguments were that for a number of reasons related to how
Libya emerged, to the role oil played in its development, and due to
the impact of ideological beliefs, the country's economy continued to
show economic disequilibria, and appeared to remain subject to
political manipulation at the expense of economic expertise. While the
country after 2003 moved slowly toward a more rational management,
the momentum of reform had started to slow down and Libya was
essentially stagnating at the eve of the February 2011 uprising. 
In thinking about reconstructing the Libyan economy in a post-civil war
situation, there are three points to make: 
(1) The emergence of a new government will make possible the rethinking
of the future of Libya's economy. 
(2) The realities of Libya's economic development described in this
paper, the physical damage inflicted by the civil war, as well a number
of social and political legacies related to the civil war and how it is
eventually settled will have a major impact on how deep and lasting
economic reforms will be. 
(3) The replacement of the current government will not deus ex machina
obliterate the patterns of patronage in existence since 1969. Only a
restructuring of political and economic institutions can achieve that goal,
and undoubtedly many individuals in Libya will want to maintain the old
structures to preserve their own patronage and power.
These necessitate not only obvious changes to how the economy of
Libya has been managed, but also to the broader political and social
structures that must underpin and inform those new economic
initiatives. 
As in many countries where the state has played an overwhelming role,
in Libya the state's challenge in a post-civil war economy will be to
provide enough regulatory energy to eventually reduce its own role for
the benefit of private initiatives. Since the central and uncontrolled inflows
of oil revenues have been at the heart of what fueled the patronage−,
the management of these revenues and the checks and balances of
budgetary oversight and control will be the most critical element for
Libya's economic reforms. Undoubtedly there will be disputes over what
kind of institutional expression this should assume−whether in a federal
or a unitary system−but the ability to prevent "leakage" will be crucial
in preventing "defection" from taking place. 
What the reforms after 1987, in the 1990s and (to a lesser extent after
2003) made clear is that without state support for the creation of the
larger institutional settings within which economies "moving toward
market" operate, those reforms are bound to fail or will be highly
inadequate and inefficient. The new Libya therefore will need to provide
sufficient guarantees on a number of issues in order to escape the
patterns of the past: beyond the hard constraints of macroeconomic
stability, a sufficiently clear system of property rights and contract
enforcement for individuals and companies alike, mechanisms to avoid
anti-competitive behavior, ways to promote trust and cooperation, and
social and political institutions that can mitigate social conflict. The
bottom line is that given Libya’s particular history incentives alone will
not work in preventing coordination failures.  In Libya the absence of
institutions that can prevent coordination failures−rule of law, an
independent judiciary, independent labor or social groups, any type of
social partnerships−have been conspicuously absent over the last
decades. 
Beyond these larger regulatory and institutional issues remain the practical
realities that, as the National Economic Strategy pinpointed, need to be
addressed. The first concerns labor. Formal employment in Libya consists
of 43,000 people in the oil sector, but 840,000 in public services. The
energy sector contributes 60% of Libya's GDP but employs only 3% of
the formal workforce. Public services, including healthcare and education
employ 51% of the formal workforce, but only contribute 9% to GDP. The
country's informal economy provides as much as 30-40% of the official
GDP while formal employment is marred by "welfare employment"−one
third of the country's 200,000 primary school teachers and 30,000 nurses
on government payrolls are inactive, but enjoy monthly salaries. At the
same time there is massive over-employment, estimated at 30-40% in
banking sector, hotels and utility companies.
Diversification, trade, and entrepreneurship therefore will remain high
priorities for any future Libyan government. The clusters suggested 
by  the  National  Economic  Strategy−energy,  tourism,  agriculture,
construction, transit trade−certainly provide a focus worthy of attention
but, as the Strategy also points out, will need substantial modifications
to the current business environment (The General Planning Council of
Libya, 2006).
Libya−in spite of the revolutionary rhetoric−has always managed and
operated its energy sector, and particularly the LNOC, in a professional
manner. Its actual management and recruitment were virtually immune
from the revolutionary diktats and from the patronage across the years.While
neither professional management nor expertise is at issue, Libya's
oil/gas/energy sector nevertheless faces a number of difficult tasks. InA f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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addition to damage suffered during the civil war, these will include a need
to substantially upgrade the country's refineries, to determine the pace
and scope of further investments in the sector, to fund and expand
upstream oil and gas activities, and to rethink the role of fuel subsidies in
the country's economy. These actions would necessitate changes within
the sector's organizational practice and to institutional arrangements within
the country. This will require greater coordination between the LNOC, the
General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL), and the country's Energy
Ministry−a task that will likely need an independent oversight and
management team. Part of the discussion will need to be fuel price subsidies
to reduce local demand and to halt actual subsidies that by the beginning
at 2011 were perhaps as high as $7 billion.32
As in many oil exporting countries, issues of manpower and adequate
training  and  education  have  been  notable  characteristics  of
development in Libya. Except at very select top institutions like the
LNOC and the Central and commercial banks, Libya lacks not only a
sufficient number of professional managers but suffers as well from
their lack of exposure to international norms and standards that can
make companies more efficient and more likely to be competitive.
There is a great need for both intra- and inter-sectoral training that
needs to be integrated with wider planning initiatives. Together with
the relatively "clean management" of the energy sector, Libya's banking
system−still largely government-owned−until the civil war of 2011
presented a moderately optimistic picture. The restructuring of the
state-owned commercial banks and the privatization in the sector after
2006 had achieved some traction. 
By 2011, two of the five public commercial banks had been privatized,
with options for foreign investors to eventually purchase up to 51%. Two
other commercial banks merged shortly afterwards, and Libyan officials
were intent on privatizing the last commercial bank through the stock
market. At the same time both the United Arab Emirates and Qatar were
engaged in the creation of two new banking groups. Although there was
hope at the time that these changes would lead to a further opening up
of the sector, analysts warned that some structural issues remained.  A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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5. Strategic Options 
W
hen the uprising started in February 2011 the question of
whether the voices for reform and effective state consolidation
in Libya could effectively coalesce into an integrated channel for
continued and meaningful reform remained unclear. While there are
undoubtedly signs of pragmatism and a realization among Libyan
policymakers for the need for greater efficiency, the country’s system
of governance remains  immovable. With new windfalls from an
expanded oil sector flowing into the country, the lack of institutional
checks and balances should be the first focus for any reconstruction.
The remaining bifurcation between the formal and the informal sectors
in the country’s political and economic life remained a notable feature
of Libya's political economy that had a daily impact on the management
of the country's economy.
Under a new government, many of these larger issues of governance
will not seem as insurmountable−but decades of structural inefficiencies
and widely perceived patronage may prove very difficult to remedy. And
although it is still difficult to envision the exact conditions under which
the reconstruction of Libya's economy will take place, there are a number
of observations we can make, irrespec    tive of those eventual conditions:
• The  hard  constraints  of  macroeconomic  stability,  efficient  and
transparent budget and sovereign wealth fund management will be
a critical, early component of Libya's economic recovery. Particularly
in light of disclosures of poor management and lack of checks and
balances regarding the country's budgets and its Sovereign Wealth
Fund assets in the past, better and more transparent management
will not only improve economic performance, but will also provide a
measure of trust needed for broader reforms. International expertise
can be a valuable aspect of these critical early measures. 
• As in most post-civil war countries, Libya's needs in terms of economic
and reconstruction expertise will essentially be limitless. This will be
particularly the case if the oil/natural gas infrastructure and production
facilities are severely damaged or destroyed. The key to reconstruction
will be political governance matched by economic reconstruction and
by legitimacy for those in charge of the post-conflict governing
structures. The ability to synchronize these requirements will be difficult
but indispensable. 
• Development of an early and detailed, rigorous economic recovery 
plan that Libyans themselves can manage is critical. For this purpose 
a proactive set of policies to involve the key players is crucial. In 
light of the country's history, Libyans will be skeptical of prolonged 
international  presence−whether  for  humanitarian,  economic 
reconstruction, or aid purposes. Part of this will undoubtedly 
necessitate the creation of a legal and constitutional framework that 
makes economic development and equity possible to all Libyan 
participants. 
• There is a need to prevent the realignment of the economic
strategies of the different parties currently engaged in the conflict.
Civil wars tend to realign local societies and local economies, and
unless  forcefully  resisted,  tend  to  perpetuate  pre-civil  war
cleavages. It is likely that the informal networks of economic power
in the country will persist. This applies not only to members of the
regime in a post-civil war situation, but also for those rebels who
may not find a place in whatever new, formal structures emerge.
Pre-existing economic elites almost invariably tend to persist
alongside whatever new formal political and economic institutions
emerge. 
• A  crucial  component  will  be  the  recruitment  and  retention  of
competent personnel and bureaucrats from the pre-civil war period,
to help break the perceived traditional patterns of patronage through
greater transparency and rule of law. This is particularly important
since, even if some of the current personnel and bureaucrats are
replaced (as seems likely except perhaps at the National Oil Company,
the Central Bank, and some of the other ministries), many of the old
regime's economic modus operandum will tend to persist. This hints
once more at the strong structural characteristics of rentier states,
where both the functions of the state and the expectations citizens
have of that providential state, become part and parcel of a patronage
system, that both old personnel and new personnel find attractive
to maintain stability. 
• Expertise in providing frameworks for mediating and settling disputes
related to new development strategies will be most useful for Libya.
Sustained economic reform/reconstruction in economic systems
where extensive patronage and very high levels of intermediation by
the  state  have  marked  earlier  development  strategies  requires
consistent energy and political commitment that more often than not
recalibrates the economic and political fates of those who were
instrumental in controlling the original strategy. Since in the Libyan
case those original actors may no longer be on the scene, this should
be an opportune moment to move forward. A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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